



By its decision in Umbenhower v. Labst in 1912, the
Supreme Court of the State of Ohio upheld the validity of a
common law marriage contracted in that State. Certain rules
were laid down by the court to govern such recognition. The
parties must be competent to enter into the marriage contract
and do so by words of present consent to be followed by cohabi-
tation as husband and wife. There must also be a holding out
to the community in which they reside that such a relationship
exists.
Following this authoritative statement of the law, two +cases
were decided. The first, Walker v. Walker," assigned a dower
interest to a common-law wife despite testimony to the effect
that she had had doubts at its inception and through all her
married life that the union was lawful. These doubts were
shared by her neighbors. These misgivings were immaterial,
the court held, in view of the fact that the parties had entered
into an oral contract in the presence of a witness and that from
the time of said agreement they had lived together as husband
and wife. " .. . all the actions and statements of Abraham
Walker were to the effect that she was his wife; that the child
born was his own daughter, and in his will he treats her as his
daughter and gives her the bulk of his estate. . . . it seems to
the court, under all these circumstances, it would be an outrage
and a great wrong to hold otherwise than that Amanda Whit-
ney was the common-law wife of Abraham Walker."
* This is the second part of Miss Moynahan's article. The first part
appeared in the fall issue. 5 O.S.L.J. 26.
t Member of the Bar of the State of New York; Research Attorney,
Office of the General Counsel, Social Security Board.
: 85 O.S. 238, 97 N.E. 83z (1912), see note 53, Part I.
15 O.N.P. (N.S.) 189; 28 O.D. (N.P.) 391 (1913).
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The second 1913 case, Erie Railroad v. Dump," held that
it was no error for the trial court to allow a child by a common-
law marriage to be made a party in an action to recover dam-
ages for death caused by negligence, although the petition filed
by the administratrix against the railroad company had alleged
that the deceased was unmarried and left no children. The
statute permitting a death action gave no protection to next of
kin omitted in the pleadings, but, said the court of appeals, "to
hold that the law will not allow such next of kin to intervene
and set up their claim would be to turn the statute, in some
cases, from a beneficient one, designed to aid in the administra-
tion of justice, into an engine of oppression." The court held
that the interests of actual beneficiaries should be protected at
the trial.
Charrier v. State,6 decided in 1918, originated in a criminal
prosecution for adultery, and was the occasion for a learned and
witty opinion by Judge Grant of the Court of Appeals. The
accused had appealed his conviction and sentence through the
courts of probate and common pleas to the higher tribunal.
He offered no evidence on his own behalf before either the trial
or appellate courts, claiming that the State had not proved its
65 2 0. App. zlo, 21 O.C.C. (N.S.) 300 (1913).
66 29 O.C.C. (N.S.) 97, 30 O.C.D. 578 (1918). The accused, a native
of France, had been domiciled in the United States for some two years and
in 1917 had contracted a statutory marriage in Ohio, which the State daimed
to be meritricious because he had cohabited in France with another woman,
the prosecuting witness at the trial, under such circumstances and holdings out
as would constitute a so-called "common-law marriage" as understood and
allowed in Ohio. The testimony of the alleged French wife was to the
effect that she had met and cohabited with the accused in Paris on the promise
that "he wouldn't marry her right away," though he had later assured her
that "you are my wife now, and your daughter" (by a previous meretricious
relationship) "is my daughter." They began to call each other husband and
wife and lived together as such, the union resulting in the birth of a child.
With the two children the couple had. later emigrated to Canada, holding
themselves out as a family, and with the constant promise by the man that he
would have a religious marriage ceremony performed, which he continually
postponed owing to financial difficulties. In 1915 he abandoned her and
coming to the United States contracted the formal marriage made the basis
of the prosecution.
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case. Judge Grant gave a detailed and lucid exposition of the
institution of common-law marriage, tracing its origin in canon
law and adoption by the common law of England, noting that
it was unaffected by the decrees of the Council of Trent, and at
the time of the separation of England and the American Colo-
nies became the common law of the United States. The court
pointed out that the institution had continued in England until
its validity was denied in the Qimeen v. Millis by reason of Lord
Hardwicke's Act in 1753, which, however, had never applied to
the English colonies, and stated that "It follows that the com-
mon-law marriage institution, brought from England by our
ancestors, has full standing in the courts of such of the United
States today as have not denied it by statute."
Concluding, however, that under all the authorities the
validity of a marriage is determined by the lex loci where con-
tracted, the court, at page io6, summarized the issue raised by
the appeal as follows:
We have then, this state of things: A relation in France which when
first established offended the received notions of morality and so was
meretricious. From this arises the presumption that the connection con-
tinued to be meretricious until proof is forthcoming that the cohabita-
tion became lawful, the burden of repelling this presumption by proof
removing it being cast upon the claimant of a legal relation. We have,
further, the fact of history that the common law of England, or its
equivalent in jurisprudential value, never was the law of France.
And we have the legal corollary that the relation of this man and
this woman, established in Paris, in Ohio stands loaded with whatever
legal shortcomings and infirmities existed by virtue of the laws of France
at the time it was entered into. If that relation continued to be meretri-
cious up to the time when it was ended, and was not at any time a lawful
cohabitation, then a lawful marriage of one of the parties to a third
party, with its physical consummation, could not be the source of the
adulterous intercourse denounced by the statute under which the accused
is here prosecuted.
Reversing the judgment of affirmance by the court of com-
mon pleas, and rendering a judgment of acquittal on the facts
and the law, the court stated at page Iio:
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Our conclusion is that, within judicial knowledge, as a fact of his-
tory, the relations and conduct of the parties in France relied on by the
state to establish a marriage at common law, were insufficient to operate
that effect, in contemplation of the law of that country, by which the
validity of the claimed marriage is alone to be measured and tested. To
the benefit of this conclusion the accused was, and is entitled.
Allen v. Allen,"7 decided in 1923, is interesting. The deci-
sions applied the precedent of the recognition by Ohio law of
the validity of a common-law marriage "notwithstanding none
of the formal legal requirements have been complied with," in
an action to annul a marriage on the ground that the female
contracting it had not obtained her father's consent thereto as
provided by the statute. The bride was within the age limit
requiring such consent, but above the age fixed by the Legisla-
ture for entrance into a contract of marriage. The ceremony
had been followed by cohabitation and the court held the mar-
riage valid.
Days v. Thompson, Admr" reached the higher court on
appeal from the court of common pleas' judgment that a com-
mon-law marriage had not been established by the evidence.
The case is briefly reported in the Law Abstract although a
court of appeals decided against the administration of the estate
of a deceased woman by a man seeking to obtain title to certain
property as her common-law husband. The original relation-
ship would appear to have been meretricious, and the presump-
tion that it so continued was not overcome by the evidence. The
court's opinion in affirming the judgment appealed from is
summarized and sets forth the recognized principles governing
the recognition of a common-law marriage in Ohio.6"
6zl 0. L. Rep. 313 (1923).
68 3 0. L. Abs. 634 (1925).
" The enumeration follows:
i. While the General Code provides certain regulations as to the exer-
cise of the right to marry, it does not prohibit marriage under the
rules of the common law.
z. "An agreement of marriage hn praesenti when made by patties com-
petent to contract accompanied and followed by cohabitation as hus-
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The opinion of the appellate court in Dirion v. Brewer,
Admr was one of three written by Vickery, P. J., between
1925 and 1931 in cases involving common-law marriages. Two
of these decisions were affirmed by the Supreme Court's refus-
ing to compel the court of appeals to certify its record, although
one decision7 denied and the other"2 upheld the disputed status.
In the third case,73 Judge Vickery disagreed with his colleagues,
and wrote a dissenting opinion that was published in the Ohio
Law Reporter.
In all three cases the original relationship had been illicit,
and the evidence presented in each afforded the learned court
an opportunity to particularize the kind of proof necessary to
establish a common-law marriage as against the presumption
that the union continued as it had begun.
The Dirion" case was a proceeding brought against the ad-
ministrator of the estate of Henry F. Sheips to establish the
plaintiff's legitimacy for purposes of inheritance. The record on
appeal showed that Sheips, when a mature man, had cohabited
with Josephine's mother, the latter being then about sixteen
band and wife, they being so treated and reputed in the community
and circle in which they move, establishes a valid marriage at com-
mon law and a child of such marriage is legitimate and may inherit
from the father."
3. A common-law marriage, however, rests on contract. It is not a
promise to be performed in the future, but must be the result of
an agreement to take effect in praesenti.
4- When such contract is entered into it may be proved "by competent
parol proof and circumstances when the degree of proof is clear and
satisfactory to the court or jury."
5. When persons have lived together illicitly for many years, as the
evidence herein disclosed, the presumption is that such an arrange-
ment continued.
6. The judgment is not manifestly against the weight of the evidence,
and no error exists prejudicial to Days.
70 20 0. App. 298, 15i N.E. 818 (1925). Motion to certify record
overruled in 23 0. L. Rep. 589.
71 Lumas v. Lumas, 26 0. App. 5oz, i6o N.E. 480 (1927). Motion to
certify record overruled in 25 0. L. Rep. 638.
7 2 Diron v. Brewer, note 70, su pra.
7' Duhigg v. Duhigg, 31 0. L. Rep. 6oo (App. 1929), note 80, post.
74 Notes 70-72, supra.
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years of age. Although he thereby laid himself open to statu-
tory charges, these were not pressed by the family of the girl,
Carrie Koop. Instead and before the plaintiff's birth, Sheips
had assured her elder sister that he would marry Carrie and his
language to that sister was quoted in proof that he had carried
out the agreement. "Didn't I do as I agreed when I said I
would marry your sister," which the court held justified the
inference that a marriage had taken place."'
The couple continued to live together and were recognized
in the neighborhood as man and wife; the deceased acknowl-
edged the child Josephine as his daughter.
Addressing itself to the theory that a common-law marriage
between the parties had been sufficiently established by the
evidence to remove the presumption that a meretricious rela-
tionship continued, the court ruled that the proof of cohabitation
and reputation submitted should be considered sufficient,
although the court of appeals in the Third Circuit, the Bates v.
State"8 decision, had ruled that such proof under the statute 7
was applicable to divorce matters only. Said the court:
I presume he meant that it did not apply to criminal matters, but if
that statute makes proof of cohabitation and reputation sufficient to
establish a marriage that may be dissolved, with much more reason
75 In further comment on the evidence the Court said:
"We have the evidence of the girl's mother, which the lower court ruled
out, but which we think is competent, being an exception to the hearsay rule,
as it is the statement of a deceased ancestor relating to the birth of a child.
Before she died she was cognizant of what might be said about her daughter,
and she in effect said this:
'Don't let them tell Josephine that she is illegitimate because I say to
you that we were married before Josephine was born,'
which, if true, established that Josephine was born in lawful wedlock. And
there is not any evidence in this record that disputes that proposition or the
proposition that the father made to the aunt of this girl that he would and
had married her."
78 Note io, supra.
7 The old Revised Statute, section 5698 (now section 11989, General
Code, 5' Ohio Laws, p. 379, sec. 6) provided:
"Proof of cohabitation, and reputation of the marriage of the parties,
is competent evidence to prove such marriage, and within the discretion of
the court, may be sufficient evidence therefor."
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should that rule apply when it comes to a question of making legitimate
or bastardizing an innocent product of such relationship.
The Bates decision was held offset by Carmichael v. State,
a Supreme Court decision, which had been followed by other
Ohio cases fully recognizing a common-law marriage status.
This case is also authority for the proposition that the law
favors legitimacy, and will indulge in all presumptions to carry
out that presumption and make the child legitimate. The court
held "that at some time before the birth of the plaintiff her
father and mother were married and that she therefore was a
legitimate child, and is entitled to inherit from her father."
In Lumas v. Lumas8 the evidence relied upon to prove a
common-law marriage was not considered convincing by Judge
Vickery under the rules he had laid down in the Dirion case.
The judgment of the common pleas court awarding plaintiff
alimony in her divorce action was reversed and judgment
entered for the defendant."
The third case, Duhigg v. Duhigg,° in which Judge Vickery
wrote a strong dissenting opinion to the affirmance by the Court
of Appeals of a judgment granting divorce and alimony to a
78 26 0. App. 5o2, 16o N.E. 480 (19z7), note 71, supra.
79 It appeared from the evidence in this case that at intervals between two
marriages and divorces from other men the plaintiff and defendant had had
illicit relations. During a residence she had established in Cleveland he had
lived for some time as a boarder in her home. On the trial of this present
action of divorce from Lumas, the lower court found that she had become the
common law wife of the latter some time between January 22, and July x,
19zz. The testimony was conflicting. The defendant testified he had never
lived with this woman as her husband under an agreement or understanding,
either express or implied, from which the marriage relation would result. The
woman's grown children coming home one time found them living together
and he asked "How do you like your new father?" Instances were given
where he introduced her as his wife and acquaintances testified that they lived
together. Other evidence in the neighborhood indicated that they were not
known as husband and wife. Subsequent to so-called marriage she signed deed
as single woman to convey real estate, using name of her first husband. The
defendant also deeded property as a single man apparently with her knowledge
and consent. The rights of third persons would therefore be affected in hold-
ing this relationship common law marriage.
so 31 0. L. Rep. 6oo (App. i9z9); note 73, supra.
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woman claiming the status of a common-law wife. The evi-
dence was held insufficient to overcome the presumption that
the original meretricious relationship continued during the so-
called marriage. The parties had never lived together in a
common home, the woman, going under the name of Mrs.
Dunn, had rented a room in a boarding house where the man
visited her and was known as Mr. Dunn, although he kept
separate rooms of his own under his proper name of Duhigg.
As the result of the relationship a child had been born, the
father contributing to its support and that of the mother for
several years before entering into a ceremonial marriage with
another woman. It was not until these contributions ceased that
the claim of a common-law wife was asserted by the plaintiff.
The decision of the majority of the appellate court is not re-
ported and the evidence upon which the status was upheld is
not apparent.
When in 1931 the case of Schwartz v. Schwartz8 reached
the appellate court, Judge Vickery, who by now felt that he
had sufficiently championed the cause of common-law marriage
in Ohio, delivered himself in no uncertain terms of a rejection
of the evidence82 presented to him in support of an alleged
common-law marriage in what he truly called an "amazing
situation !"
Ohio has gone as far as any state in recognizing a common-law
marriage. This member of the court has gone as far as any other court
81 35 0. L. Rep. 66 (App. 1931).
8 2 The plaintiff, Anne Louise Grossman, had been awarded alimony and
counsel fees in the common pleas court on the claim of a common-law marriage
with Ferdinand Schwartz, who had denied both the promise of marriage and
cohabitation. In as much as it was her word against his and the evidence dis-
closed no evidence of cohabitation, no agreement to live together as husband
and wife, merely a series of letters between the pair in which the terms
"Hubby" and "Wifie" were used ad nauseam. The court held that these
terms of affection were neither discriminate nor important. The record indi-
cated that while the couple were attracted toward each other and had prob-
ably thought of marriage in the future when Schwartz had graduated from
medical school and established himself as a physician, there was no actual evi-
dence of their entering into a present contract of marriage, the testimony of
the girl's father being held conclusive on that point.
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in holding there can be such a thing as a common-law marriage. Ever
since the decision in the case of Carmichael v. State, 12 O.S. 553, that
has been the rule, but to establish the relation, there must be dear and
convincing evidence. Perhaps if there had been a written agreement,
or a contract made in the presence of witnesses, that these persons had
been married, proof of cohabitation following such agreement, even
though there were no holding out, might be sufficient; but in all the
cases that I have had anything to do with the plaintiff has relied upon a
"holding out," to a more or less degree in establishing the marriage
relation.
* * . the basic principle was found in 12 O.S., supra, that in order
to constitute a common-law marriage, there must be a clear understand-
ing and agreement to live together as husband and wife. That must be
followed by cohabitation following immediately after the agreement.
The agreement must be in praesenti, and not some time in the future.
Then, if after that the parties hold out each other as husband and wife,
and the husband pays the bills for the wife, or has a charge account, or
they are known as husband and wife, it does constitute a common-law
marriage, and then that marriage is just as lawful and just as binding as
any other marriage. But to let down the bars and permit such conduct
as these persons indulged in to be the basis of a common-law marriage
would be making a mockery of marriage, and be contrary to the policy
of the State recognizing the sacredness of the marriage ties.
Prior to the decision in the Schwartz case, which was dis-
cussed at this point because it concluded the series of Judge
Vickery's opinion, five other cases had again brought common-
law marriages before the Ohio courts.
The first of these was the important Howard v. Central
Nat'l. Bank et al,83 which originated as follows:
Upon tle death intestate of one Harry B. Hulings, a
woman known as Maud Hulings was appointed administratrix
of his estate on the supposition that she was his common-law
widow. Later one Lulu Hulings appeared and reported her-
self as the widow of the deceased. Whereupon Maud resigned
and the bank was appointed administrator de bonis non of the
estate. A sister of the deceased, Elizabeth Hulings Howard,
laid claim to money on deposit on behalf of herself, another
83 zi 0. App. 74, 15? N.E. 784 (1926).
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sister, and three children of a predeceased brother, alleging that
her brother Harry left no widow and praying that the claim
of Lulu be set aside. Lulu thereupon filed an answer, setting
up her claim to be the widow, and the interest of Lulu's grand-
son, Harry Hulings Schaeffer, was represented by its guardian,
the Pennsylvania Trust Company of Pittsburgh. The Central
National Bank requested a ruling by the court on the conflicting
claims of the parties. The trial court found that a common-law
marriage had existed between Lulu and Harry, and that Harry
Hulings Schaeffer was their surviving grandson and entered
judgment accordingly.
On appeal this judgment was affirmed and a subsequent
motion to certify the record was overruled by the Supreme
Court of Ohio.
Inasmuch as the alleged marriage was consummated in
Pennsylvania, its validity depended upon the laws of that State,
which recognized common-law marriage upon proper proof
thereof. Both Ohio and Pennsylvania were in accord that such
proof may consist of "reputation, declarations and conduct."
Irrespective of the testimony of a surviving party to the con-
tract of marriage, " she not having testified that the ensuing
8 Lulu's testimony was that after a short acquaintance Harry had induced
her to break off an engagement to another man and promise to marry him.
After some months he proposed that they live together as man and wife with-
out a religious ceremony. At first she said she refused, but finally consented.
Her testimony continued as quoted from the record.
"Question: What, if anything, did he say about that kind of marriage?
A. He said that, and he took my hand and he said, 'Now we are man and
wife,' and he kissed me, and after that we went in to my mother-of course
he had talked about marriage so much-and he told my mother we had
gotten married, and she said she wasn't surprised, and he put his hand on
my shoulder, and my mother shook hands with us and kissed us both."
Concerning this testimony the Appellate Court said at page 84:
"The language thus imputed to Hulings, 'Now we are man and wife'
is ambiguous. It is not clear whether he means to express his opinion of the
legal effect of the proposals . . . or to then and there declare the existence
of a marriage relation between the parties. The latter construction is the
one that is most nearly in accord with decency."
Pointing out that there was no eviddnce of secrecy or illicit relationship in
their procedure, the court went on to say:
"It is consequently sound public policy to view the language quoted as
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cohabitation was meretricious, but merely to an agreement of
doubtful import, such evidence is admissible.
The argument that such proof should be resorted to (that
is, of cohabitation and reputation)8 only where there is no direct
testimony by one or both of the parties as to the terms of the
contract itself, was met by the court's statement that "such rule
might well be invoked if it involved no rights except those of
the party testifying, and such party so testified that it appeared
that no marriage in fact had been consummated."
The court pointed out that in the instant case "We have an
infant who is entitled to prove his right to the succession by any
and all evidence that tends to establish his mother's legitimacy.
He is not bound by his grandmother's inability to reproduce
after forty years the identical language that she claims was
employed in consummating the informal marriage."
This case also holds that marriage by verba de praesenti may
be consummated if the man alone expresses them and the
woman merely acquiesces. Further, that a delay of many years
by the woman in asserting her claim to marriage is not conclu-
sive against her, but only a circumstance to be considered; as
was also the evidence of Lulu's mother that they had told her
describing the then purpose of Hulings to take Lulu for his wedded wife.
It would be a grave injustice after these parties had held themselves out as
husband and wife, and raised a daughter, held out as legitimate, to permit
either of them to take advantage of equivocal language, after that daughter
on the strength of her legitimacy had married a young man who would
have recoiled from that sort of an alliance, if his prospective bride had been
illegitimate. We conclude, therefore, that, when Hulings said, 'Now we
are man and wife,' he was declaring his marriage in verba de praesenti."
I" The proof consisted of the neighbor's recognition of Lulu as Mrs.
Hulings upon his introduction to her as his wife; of letters from Hulings to
Lulu addressing her as"Dear Wife," their joint execution of deeds conveying
real estate, and a deposition signed by him to the effect that while he was a
resident of Marietta, his wife (Lulu) lived in Pittsburgh. Additional evidence
was that on the daughter's birth she received the name of Huling's mother,
that she was brought up and married believing herself Huling's child. Sur-
viving members of Huling's family had also attested their trust and confi-
dence in Lulu, his own sisters testifying to their surprise on learning that the
marriage between her and Harry had not been solemnized. The foregoing,
said the Court, "would of itself be satisfactory proof of the marriage if the
testimony of Lulu were not in the case at all."
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they had been married by an alderman in Pittsburgh. This last,
said the court, if correct, only tends to show that they were
ashamed of the unconventional methods adopted by them, and
"is not necessarily inconsistent with their informal marriage in
fact."
In affirming the judgment, the court repeated the rule laid
down by Umbenhower v. Labus6 that a common-law marriage
in Ohio must be established by dear and convincing evidence.
In Johnson v. Wolford"7 it was held that a ceremonial mar-
riage, void because the husband, one of the parties thereto, was
already married, became a valid common-law marriage upon
the death of the first wife and continued cohabitation thereafter.
The question arose in a partition suit against the alleged
widow."8 The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the
lower court in favor of the plaintiff and rendered judgment for
the widow, holding that "the intent and actual agreement to be
married which inhered in the ceremonial marriage innocently
contracted . . . will be imputed by the law to the cohabitation
after the death (of the first wife) so as to establish a valid
marriage at common law."
Citing many cases in support of the conclusions that an
illegal marriage innocently contracted becomes valid upon re-
moval of the impediment, the court said, at page 386:
If the marriage between Johnson and Cora had been other than a
ceremonial marriage, or if Cora had known, or had reasonable grounds
8" Notes 53, 59, supra.
87 11 7 0 . S. 136, 157 N.E. 385 (1927)..
88 The deceased Johnson had married Cora Frances, named herein as
party defendant, by a ceremonial marriage in Ohio and thereafter they cohab-
ited as husband and wife, so continuing until his death. Cora was at the time
ignorant of the fact that Johnson had previously married two other women, the
first of whom had already been married and the record did not disclose
whether her former husband was dead or divorced from her at the time she
entered into the ceremony with Johnson. When Johnson married his second
wife there was no evidence that he had secured a divorce from the first,
although the second thereafter obtained a divorce from him based on the
validity of that marriage. The first wife died about a month prior to John-
son's death and there was conflicting testimony as to whether or not Johnson
and Cora knew of her death.
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to believe, that Johnson had a wife living at the time of that ceremony
and had proceeded in disregard of such knowledge or belief, or if she
had learned at any time during the period of their cohabitation that
Johnson was not competent to contract marriage at the time of the
ceremony, or if there had been a separation, whether voluntary or legal
prior to the death of Laura . . . or if for any other reason the relation
between Johnson and Cora had been a mere meretricious cohabitation,
this court would without hesitation hold that there was no valid mar-
riage, even under the rules of the common law, without a new agree-
ment after the death of Laura . . . followed by continued cohabitation.
Holmes v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co.89 was an action brought
by the executrix as surviving widow of a deceased switchman,
against the employer railroad under Federal Employees Lia-
bility Act (45 U.S.C.A., sec. 51-59). The trial court had direc-
ted a verdict for the defendant, refusing to permit the plaintiff
to testify to the conversation between herself and the deceased
as to their "agreement together" to resume the marital relation-
ship, they having previously been married and divorced, on the
ground that it would constitute personal communications be-
tween husband and wife. Counsel for the executrix had ex-
cepted, stating that he expected the evidence would show the
agreement, thus saving his case on appeal. The case was re-
versed and remanded by the Supreme Court, the opinion
stating:
Such conversation would not be incompetent as a communication
between husband and wife for the reason that they had been previously
divorced, and no common-law marriage would exist until after the
agreement was made and was followed consistently by the indicia of the
marriage relation. The mere fact that there may have been an agree-
ment to live together as man and wife would not be sufficient even if
followed by such indicia, unless made per verba de traesent. . . . If
such agreement was made, but by words of the future tense, there could
be no common-law marriage. The court erred in not permitting the
conversation . . . to show whether or not the agreement was or was
not made by words of the present tense.
The decision follows authority of Umbenhower v. Labus in
89 z8 0. App. 297, I6z N.E. 675 (19?7).
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the recognition of a common-law marriage upon proper proof
thereof.
Jenkins v. Jenkins" was another partition action commenced
by the heirs of ond Alfred Jenkins to divide his real estate.
Alma Diehl Jenkins, one of the defendants, claimed dower on
the premises as widow of the deceased, alleging also that as she
had furnished part of the purchase money, the decedent held
the title in trust for her. This second claim was disallowed by
the Court of Appeals, but the contention of Alma Diehl Jenkins
that she was the common-law wife of Alfred was upheld on the
authority of Johnson v. Wolford9 ' and Dirion v. Brewer,
Admnr.92 The evidence disclosed that both parties had been
previously married; that the deceased had abandoned his wife
Lista, the mother of the three children involved in the partition
action and left Virginia with the defendant Alma, then the wife
of Diehl. They came to Ohio and lived and cohabited as hus-
band and wife for more than 30 years. Shortly after the couple
left Virginia, Diehl secured a divorce from his-wife Alma, but
Lista, the former wife of Jenkins, lived in Virginia until her
death in 1923. In Ohio Alma and Alfred were universally
recognized as husband and wife and had purchased the land
involved in this action, the deed being taken in Alfred's name;
they worked the land together to complete payments. "There
is some testimony tending to show an agreement on their part
to become husband and wife" but impediment existed in the fact
that Lista was still living.
The Appellate Court ruled that "In view of the facts and
circumstances shown in this case, establishing the long-continued
relations between the parties, showing that they resided and
cohabited together as husband and wife, and held themselves
out to their friends and neighbors as such, which continued down
to the time of the death of Alfred Jenkins, and until after all
90 30 0. App. 336, 164 N.E. 790 (i9z8).
Note 87, supra.
92 Notes 70, 72, 74, supra.
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impediments to their marriage had been removed, and in view
of the added fact that there is testimony tending to show an
agreement in the present tense to become husband and wife,
this court is forced to the conclusion that a common-law mar-
riage existed between them, and that Alma Diehl Jenkins is
the widow and entitled to dower in the premises involved in
this action."
In Gillmore v. Dorning9' the appellate court refused to rec-
ognize a common-law marriage although the relationship had
existed for a dozen years, the evidence disclosing, however, that
no attempt had been made to establish a home or a holding out
to the public as man and wife.94 It affirmed the judgment of the
Common Pleas Court, to which court the cause was appealed
from a decision of the Probate Court, holding that no common-
law marriage had been established and that the person ap-
pointed as administratrix of George T. Gillmore, deceased, was
not his widow. The question in review before the higher court
was whether the holding that no common-law marriage existed
was dearly against the weight of evidence. The court held that,
though conflicting, the evidence was sufficient to support the
judgment that no marriage existed. The evidence, in other
words, did not meet the test of a marriage in praesenti followed
by cohabitation and reputation, as laid down for such marriages
03 31 0. L. Rep. 588 (1930).
" The evidence disclosed no ceremonial marriage, no witnesses present
because the decedent was allegedly "constitutionally against" the marriage
service, although seemingly ritualistic form of words was adhered to. No valid
reason was given for failing to establish a home; they lived separate and apart
for twelve years except for occasional week ends together in Cleveland. The
woman carried on business in her own name by a former marriage and as
Mrs. Mabelle Beier executed a chattel mortgage. Indeed the only occasions on
which Gillmore had introduced her as his wife were when such introductions
appeared forced upon him. At his funeral Mrs. Beier had told the nurse that
she was engaged to marry him but that the marriage had never taken place.
She had even denied that she was Mrs. Gillmore but as Mrs. Beier had guar-
anteed with the brother of the deceased to pay certain incidental funeral
expenses.
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in the Umbenhower," Johnson," Lomas97 and Jenkinss cases.
The court also referred to the ruling in Howard v. Central Nat.
Bank9 that a common-law marriage must be established by dear
and convincing evidence. The fact that there had been no illicit
relations before the alleged marriage took place did not alter
the necessity, in proving a common-law marriage, that "there
must be a meeting of the minds, a mutual contract followed by
living together as husband and wife to the extent, as in other
marriages, that the ceremony and acts have become a matter of
repute in the vicinity and community where the parties resided."
State ex. Judd v. Haber""° was an original action in man-
damus to compel payment of a monthly pension to the widow
of a deceased policeman. The Board of Trustees of the fund
had denied the widow's original application on the ground that
she was not the wife of Lucius Judd at the time of his retire-
ment from the police force. It appeared that under the by-laws
and regulations a lump-sum had already been allowed her as
his widow upon her written statement in applying therefor that
she had been married to Judd after his retirement from the
Department. In the mandamus action the widow alleged that
prior to the ceremonial marriage, which was admittedly eight
years subsequent to the retirement in 19i2, she and Judd had
been united by a common-law marriage since I902; that by
reason thereof she was entitled to the pension. The evidence
indicates that while some of their acquaintances recognized them
as husband and wife during the earlier period, others had no
such knowledge that though they had been intimate, there had
been no common home until after the statutory marriage. The
" Umbenhouer v. Labus, 85 O.S. 738, 97 N.E. 832, supra, notes 53-59-
9 Johnson v. Wolford, 1170.S. 136, I57 N.E. 385 (19z7), supra,
note 87.
9
"Lumas v. Lumas, 26 0. App. 502, x6o N.E. 480 (1927), supra,
note 78.
9 Jenkins v. Jenkins, 30 0. App. 336, 164 N.E. 790 (1928), supra,
note 90.
o9 Howard v. Central Nat'l. Bank, 21 0. App. 74, 152 N.E. 784e(I926),
supra, note 83.
00 13 0. L. Abs. 137 (932).
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court held that the ceremony was evidently regarded by the
parties as the true marriage. Taken in connection with the
widow's own statement above referred to, it was considered
strong, if not conclusive, evidence disproving the alleged com-
mon-law marriage. "While common-law marriages are recog-
nizable in Ohio, it was incumbent upon the relator to prove the
existence of same, by proof of the agreement to such marriage
when entered into, the holding out to the public that they are
man and wife, and the living together as such. While the relator
has introduced some evidence tending to establish these require-
ments, we are of opinion that the relator's case has been over-
thrown by the rebuttal evidence . . . The writ is refused."
In 1934, the appeal of Novaksky v. State'' sought a re-
versal for error in admitting testimony of an alleged common-
law wife. The man claimed to have procured a marriage license.
However, that very fact, said the court, indicated at best that
a ceremonial and not a common-law marriage was intended, and
"There is nothing in the case to indicate that they at any time
entered into an agreement that they should consider themselves
and be from that time husband and wife."
In Re Estate of Fred A. Twellman 2 originated in the Pro-
bate Court of Franklin County on an application of Leona
Twellman, as alleged widow of Fred A. Twellman, to set aside
the appointment of Frank Cowden as administrator of his estate.
The application was overruled on the court's holding that she
was not the legal widow.
It appeared that in 1923 the parties had entered into a non-
ceremonial marriage in Missouri, a State which prohibits com-
mon-law marriages. Having agreed to become man and wife
and living together as such in Missouri, they moved to Colum-
bus, Ohio, in 1926 and continued the same mode of life until
they separated in 1929. During the residence period in Colum-
bus, they held church membership as Mr. and Mrs. Twelman,
101 18 0. L. Abs. 313 (1934).
102 32 Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 201 (1934).
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introduced each other and were known to their friends as hus-
band and wife.
On the well-known principle that lex loci governs so far
as the marriage status is concerned, the court held that since the
couple were living in adultery in Missouri, that status accom-
panied them to Ohio. That in order to legitimate their relation-
ship in the latter State "it became necessary to comply with the
laws of Ohio relative to the creation of the common-law mar-
riage status."
Quoting the syllabi in the Dirion"'0 and Lumas.. cases,
requiring clear and convincing evidence to overcome the pre-
sumption of continuing illicit relationship, the court said that
here Leona Twellman herself gave the only testimony. She
stated that when Twellman had given her a ring in Columbus,
she had expressed a wish to have a religious ceremony per-
formed, they being church members at the time. He had said
it was unnecessary; that they were man and wife "in the eyes
of the law and the world." That language in the court's opinion
constituted "only a reaffirmance of the relationship which had
been existing from 1923 up until the separation in 1929.",
Moreover, her testimony was considered self-serving, if com-
petent at all. The court, quoting with approval from Judge
Hurin's opinion in the Bates case, 05 stated:
It is our opinion that in order to establish a common-law marriage,
not only the element of living together, but also the element of a con-
tract, expressed or implied, should be proven by testimony which is clear
and convincing.
Only two cases have been found under the Ohio Workmen's
Compensation Act that touch on common-law marriage. The
first, Industrial Commission v. Terrell °'0 decided in 1929,
103Dirion v. Brewer, Adm'r., 20 0. App. 298, 151 N.E. 818 (1925),
supra, note 70.
04 Lumas v. Lumas, 26 0. App. 5o2, i6o N.E. 480 (1927), supra,
note 78.
105 Bates v. State, 9 0.C.C. (N.S.) 273 (19o6), supra, note io.
108 120 O.S. 59, I65 N.E. 536 (I9z9).
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merely held that a common-law wife was entitled to the pay-
ment of an award.
The second case, decided in 1934, was Industrial Comm. v.
Miller, °'0 in which an alleged widow, her original claim having
been denied because of insufficient proof of identity, petitioned
the Court of Common Pleas for review. From the judgment
entered in her favor after a jury trial, the Commissioner ap-
pealed to the higher court.
It appeared that the claimant was a native of Jugoslavia,
and believing her first husband dead, had married a fellow Slav
who later emigrated to this country. At his request she followed
him and they lived in Ohio as man and wife for twenty-five
years. Two children were born to them and christened as their
children. The declarations made by the parents on the latter
occasion were considered to be compelling proof of the marriage
status.
Although the attorney for the Commission had argued that
to constitute a valid marriage it must have been such under the
laws of Jugoslavia, the court said it did not consider the ques-
tion whether the relationship in Jugoslavia constituted a com-
mon-law marriage. It seems curious that the case of Charrier
v. State.0 8 was not cited in this connection, but the Ohio cases
relied on by the appellate court were Dirion v. Brewer,
Admn'r' °8 and Jenkins v. Jenkins."0
On these authorities the court came to the conclusion that
"regardless of whether there was a common-law marriage in
Jugoslavia and regardless of the fact that the relationship in
that country may have been illicit, that would not preclude
Miller and this plaintiff from consummating a valid common-
law marriage under the laws of Ohio after she came to this
107 18 0. L. Abs. 244 (934).
108 Charrier v. State, 29 O.C.C. (N.S.) 97 (1 918), supra, note 66.
"I Dirion v. Brewer, Admr., 2o 0. App. 298, I51 N.E. 818 (1925),
supra, note 70.
"' Jenkins v. Jenkins, 30 0. App. 336, 164 N.E. 790 (1928), supra,
note 90.
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country to live with Miller." That status was held to have been
established by the declaration and conduct of the parties in
Ohio.
The last common-law marriage decision delivered in Ohio
before Judge Brewer's opinion in the Speeler"' case, in uphold-
ing such a marriage on the evidence presented, went somewhat
to the other extreme. The syllabus states that "a common-law
marriage contract executed in praesenti by competent parties
and followed by cohabitation takes on the sanctity of a cere-
monial marriage," although the court did say that " .
ceremonial marriage with all the solemnity attending should
be encouraged, but when the State does recognize common-law
marriages it is important that they may not be easily dissolved."
The proceedings in Knight v. Shields,"' the case in question,
were commenced in the Probate Court of Montgomery County
to determine'the heirship of the estate of George Maynard
Lott. The claimant was found to be the common-law wife of
the deceased. On appeal this decision was reversed by the Com-
mon Pleas Court, which in turn was reversed by the Appellate
""' In re Speeler, 6 0.0. 529 (936), supra, note i.
112 19 0. L. Abs. 37 (935). Matilda Knight (Lott) 'made a party to
the proceedings on allegation that she was the surviving widow of George
Maynard Lott, when 17 years old had married one Dean Knight in Knox-
ville, Tennessee, where both resided at the time. After a union of two months,
they separated, Matilda returning to her mother's home and about six years
later, in 1912, she claimed to have entered a common-law marriage with
George Maynard Lott. They lived in Tennessee, later moving to Cincinnati
and Dayton, as man and wife until separation in 1929. They were recognized
in Ohio during said period as husband and wife. Insurance policies were
placed in evidence in which Matilda was designated as the wife of George.
About the time of the separation George caused a criminal charge of bigamy
to be filed against Matilda because of the earlier Knight marriage. She was
arrested but the case was never pressed and later dismissed. Thereafter and
with Lott's connivance Matilda commenced a divorce action against Knight
alleging desertion, which was also dismissed. In the Probate Court proceeding
Matilda testified that Lott had made the institution of this divorce action a
condition to their resumption of the relation they had before the 1929 sepa-
ration. There was some evidence introduced of the renewal of that relation-
ship for a brief period. But in 1932 Lott married another woman who died
that same year, and he himself passed away the following year.
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Court and the Probate Court's judgment sustained. The cause
was then remanded for further proceedings.
Recognition of the alleged common-law marriage with the
deceased turned on the competency of Matilda Knight, to con-
tract it, in view of her earlier ceremonial marriage in Tennessee.
The statute"3 of that State provided that a marriage might be
dissolved for the purpose of entering into a second, if the party
to the first marriage after an absence of five years was not known
by the other to be alive. The Court of Appeals held that under
this statute and upon Matilda's testimony that she had not heard
from Knight since his desertion of her two months after their
marriage in 1906, the earlier marriage had been dissolved be-
fore she entered into the common-law marriage with George
Maynard Lott in 1912. While there was some conflict, in the
testimony, the court did not think it justified the reviewing
tribunal in reversing the decision of the Probate Court as against
the manifest weight of evidence." 4
113 Secs. 8411, Williams Tenn. Code (1934), "A second marriage cannot
be contracted before the dissolution of the first. But the first shall be regarded
as dissolved for this purpose, if either party has been absent five years and is
not known to the other to be living." (1829 Ch. 23, sec. 16).
114 Citing the leading decisions on the status of common-law marriage in
Ohio, the court pointed out that in the Bates case only had its validity been
doubted, and concluded as follows: "It is essential to the consummation of a
common-law marriage that the contract be in praesenti. By this is meant the
language used must be susceptible of the construction that the marriage then
and there exists and not an agreement to marry in the future. It must be
consummated. A mere cohabitation is not sufficient, but under. the law of
Ohio cohabitation must follow the contract in praesenti. It must not be for a
limited period of time but the contract must contemplate a continuance during
life. When such contract is executed in praesenti followed by cohabitation, it
takes on the sanctity of a ceremonial marriage and can only be dissolved by
death or divorce. Mere separation does not dissolve the marital relation either
in ceremonial or common-law marriage. A contractual common-law marriage
like all other contracts is controlled by the law of the place where made. If
the State where the claimed contract is entered into does not recognize com-
mon-law marriages, the same would not be recognized in this State on the
contract alone. Applying this principle to the instant case it must follow that
since common-law marriages are not recognized in the State of Tennessee
except for a limited purpose, they will not be recognized in the State of Ohio
except upon the same limited basis unless on other and further showing than
the mere contract claimed to have been executed in Tennessee. The recital
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Although decisions had been submitted to show that com-
mon-law marriages were illegal in Tennessee, the Court pointed
out that two of said decisions held notwithstanding, that if the
parties cohabited as in a state of matrimony, an estoppel arose
to defeat any property rights that either spouse might have if
legally married.
To the further argument that the separation between Ma-
tilda and George Maynard Lott in I928 would dissolve any
relation existing between them even if a common-law marriage
were established, the court ruled that in contemplation of law
a common-law as well as a ceremonial marriage, once con-
tracted, must continue until death or legal dissolution. Neither
of the parties to a common-law marriage may dissolve the same
"by a separation or marriage to another person. If the common-
law marriage is to be recognized at all it must be recognized
for all purposes. The law directing that it must be a contract
in praesenti makes it effective immediately if followed by cohab-
itation. To. hold otherwise would be permitting companionate
or trial marriage. Such a situation would be obnoxious."
This decision was followed in 1936 by In re Speele-, dis-
cussed at the beginning of this article. With that challenging
opinion, the record of common-law marriage decisions in Ohio
for the time being comes to an end.
CONCLUSIONS
From the foregoing analysis of the reported cases, it is pos-
sible to summarize the position taken with regard to common-
law marriages by the Ohio courts.
of the claimed language used by Matilda and George Maynard Lott in Ten-
nessee followed by immediate cohabitation would have been sufficient under
the laws of Ohio to constitute a common-law marriage had the claimed
common-law contract taken place in this State. When Matilda and George
Maynard Lott moved to Ohio and continued their cohabitation and all the
relations of husband and wife, the law thereby supplies the imputation of
renewal of their marriage agreement in praesenti even though there was an
absence of any express declaration. The disability prescribed under the law
of Tennessee is removed when the parties took up their abode in this State
where common-law marriage is recognized. Travers v. Reinhardt, 205 U.S.
423, 440; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 30 0. App. 336 (6 Abs. 596); 26 0. Jur.,
p. 32, sec. 2I."
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I. Although based on obiter dictum in Carmichael v.
State,"' the construction in that case of the Ohio statutes regu-
lating marriage has been followed by all the later decisions with
the exception of Bates v. State."' The result is that, regardless
of the provisions of Sections I I 181 to I I 198-I of the General
Code, common-law marriages, upon proof thereof, are held
valid in Ohio even though they are not favored as a matter
of policy.",
2. That in order to constitute a valid common-law marriage
there must be
(a) An agreement to marry in praesenti;
(b) Cohabitation as husband and wife ensuing upon such
agreement;
(c) Reputation in the community that the marital relation-
ship exists.
The Ohio Supreme Court considers these three requisites es-
sential."
3. That a prior meretricious relationship between a man and
woman may become a valid common-law marriage upon proof
indicative of intent to enter into an agreement of present mar-
riage, but fails for lack of such proof." 9
4. That a marriage, either ceremonial or by consent, void
because of the existence of an impediment, may become a valid
common-law marriage upon continued cohabitation and repu-
"'C armichael v. State, I O.S. 553 (I86I), supra, note 34-
'16 Bates v. State, 9 O.C.C. (N.S.) 273 (19o6), supra, note io.
117 Swartz v. State, 13 O.C.C. 62 (1896), supra, note 4o; In re Barrett,
49 Bull. 222 (1904), supra, note 46; Drach v. Drach, 9 O.N.P. (N.S.) 353
(i91o), supra, note 54; Umbenhauer v. Labus, 85 O.S. 238 (1912), supra,
note 53-59; Howard v. Central Nat'l. Bank, 21 0. App. 74 (i926), supra,
note 83; Johnson v. Wolford, 117 0.S. 136 (1927), supra, note 87.
118 Umbenhower v. Labus, 85 O.S. 238, 97 N.E. 832 (I91?), supra,
53-59, and all cases cited.
a"
9 Dirion v. Brewer, 2o 0. App. 298, 151 N.E. 818 (1925), supra,
note 70; Johnson v. Dudley, 3 0.N.P. 196 (1896), supra, note 43; Lumas v.
Lumas, 26 0. App. 5oz, 16o N.E. 48o (1927), motion to certify record
overruled, 25 0. L. Rep. 638, supra, note 78; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 30 0. App.
336, 164 N.E. 790 (I928), supra, note 9 o .
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tation following the removal of the impediment, the law imply-
ing a renewal of the marriage contract in praesenti."2 '
5. That the law of the place where the acts occurred upon
which the marriage is sought to be established governs the cre-
ation of the marriage status. If a common-law marriage is not
recognized in the jurisdiction in which consummation thereof
is alleged, and the parties thereafter move to Ohio where such
marriages are recognized, the illicit status accompanies them.
In order to win legal recognition of their union in Ohio, they
must comply with the rules of that State governing the creation
of a common-law marriage.'21
6. That evidence necessary to prove a common-law mar-
riage must be dear and convincing,"' There is some confusion,
however, in the degree of proof required.
Thus, the Drach2' decision held that a writing, acknowl-
edging the marriage, alone was sufficient to prove its existence
by the common law, though as a matter of fact there was cohabi-
tation and publicity in that case. Oral proof of the contract is
admissible in support of a common-law as well as ceremonial
marriage by either the surviving spouse,'24 or persons acquainted
with the facts2 and circumstances. Conversations between hus-
band and wife are permitted as essential to proving the con-
tract.'26 On the other hand, a common-law marriage may be
120 Mieritz v. Insurance Co., 8 0.N.P. 422, I I O.D. (N.P.) 759
(i9OI), supra, note 44; Johnson v. Wolford, 117 O.S. 136, 157 N.E. 385
(927), supra, note 87; Jenkins v. Jenkins, 30 0. App. 336, 164 N.E. 790
(1928), supra, note 90.
121 Howard v. Central Nat'l. Bank, zi 0. App. 74, 152 N.E. 784
(1926), supra, note 83; Charrier v. State, 29 C.C.N.S. 97 (1918), supra,
note 66; Industrial Commission v. Miller, 18 0. L. Abs. 244 (I934), supra,
note 107; In re Twelman, 32 O.N.P. (N.S.) 201 (1934), supra, note iOz.
122 Umbenhower v. Labus, 85 O.S. 238 (1912), supra, note 53; Dirion
v. Brewer, 2o 0. App. 298 (1925), supra, note 70; Howard v. Central Nat'l
Bank, 2I 0. App. 74 (I926), supra, note 83.
123 Drack v. Drach, 9 0.N.P. (N.S.) 353 (191o), supra, note 54.
124 Umbenhower v. Labus, 85 O.S. 238 (1912), supra, notes 53-59;
Howard v. Central Nat'l. Bank, 21 0. App. 74 (i926), supra, note 83.
125 Days v. Thompson, 3 0. L. Abs. 634 (1925), supra, note 68.
128 Holmes v. Pere Marquette Ry. Co., z8 0. App. 297 (1927), supra,
note 89.
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shown by the conduct of the parties, by evidence of cohabitation
and reputation, even though the survivor to the alleged mar-
riage has testified to an ambiguous contract."' Although doubt-
ful at first, it was finally held that evidence of cohabitation and
reputation might be submitted to a jury in a criminal as well as
civil case. 2 ' Its sufficiency must be determined by them upon
proper instruction by the court. 29
7. That common-law marriages are indissoluble except by
death or divorce.' The legal status, once established, is not
affected by doubt as to its legality,' or by change of mind 32
on the part of either spouse.
In connection with the above rules, however, it should be
noted that in 1927, the last occasion (except for the brief Ter-
rell33 decision in 1929) on which the Ohio Supreme Court
considered a common-law marriage status, that court stated in
Johnson v. Wolford: "
Each and all of the cases which have been decided by this court
bearing upon the subject of common-law marriages have been decided
upon the peculiar facts of those cases, and it has not at any time been
declared by this court that the limitations of those cases become binding
limitations upon all future cases.
This may account for certain inconsistencies in the decisions.
127 Howard v. Central Nat'l. Bank, zI 0. App. 74 (1926), supra,
note 83.
128 Carmichad v. State, I20.S. 553 (I86I), supra, note 34; Swartz v.
State, 13 O.C.C. 67 (I896), supra, note 40; Bates v. State, 9 0.C.C. (N.S.)
273 (i9O6), aff. in part 77 O.S. 622, supra, note 1o.
1 Bates v. State, 9 0.C.C. (N.S.) 273 (19o6), aff. in part 77 0.8.
622, supra, note io; Dracl v. Drach, 9 0.N.P. (N.S.) 353 (1910), supra,
note 54.
130 Swartz v. State, 13 O.C.C. 6z (1896), supra, note 40; In re Barrett,
49 Bull. 2zz (904), supra, note 46; Knight v. Shields, i9 0. L. Abs. 37
(1935), supra, note I I2.
'T' Walker v. Walker, 15 O.N.P. (N.S.) 189 (1913), supra, note 64.
In re Barrett, 49 Bull. 222 (1904), supra, note 46.
"'Industrial Commission v. Terrell, 120 O.S. 59, 165 N.E. 536
(1929), supra, note lo6.
""'Johnson v. Wolford, 117 O.S. 136, 157 N.E. 385 (1927), supra,
note 87.
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In spite of the strong affirmance by the Supreme Court'85 that
common-law marriages are countenanced because the law favors
the legitimacy of children, the Court of Appeals in 1929, in
upholding a common-law marriage... necessarily made the chil-
dren of a later ceremonial marriage illegitimate. Again, in the
Lumas'87 case a common-law marriage was denied for lack of
an agreement showing present intent, while in the Jenkins'38
case, such intent was implied, though the circumstances seem
equally flagrant. Then too, the Jenkins case was decided on the
authority of Johnson v. Wolford,"9 though in the latter case
the Supreme Court held that the intent of the ceremonial mar-
riage innocently contracted, carried over to the implied contract,
once the impediment was removed, whereas in the Jenkins case,
there had been no ceremonial marriage between the parties,
each of whom had abandoned a living spouse.
:"' Umbenkower v. Labus, 85 O.S. 238 (1912), supra, notes 55-59;
Dirioz v. Brewer, 20 0. App. 298 (925). Motion to certify record over-
ruled, 23 0. L. Rep. 589, supra, note 70.
'
36 Duhigg v. Dukigg, 31 0. L. Rep. 6oo (1929), supra, note 8o.
117 Lumas v. Lumas, 26 0. App. 5o2, 16o N.E. 48o (1927). Motion to
certify record overruled, 25 0. L. Rep. 628, supra, note 78.
3 enkins v. Jenkins, 30 0. App. 336, 164 N.E. 790 (1928), supra,
note 90.
39 Johnson v. Wolford, 117 O.S. 136, 157 N.E. 385 (927), supra,
note 87.
